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Castillo v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 16 (May. 30, 2019)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: DEATH PENTALTY 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined that (1) a defendant is death-eligible in Nevada once the State proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of first-degree murder and at least one statutory 
aggravating circumstance; and (2) the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard does not apply to the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
 
Background 
 
In 1995, Castillo was sentenced to death for bludgeoning an elderly woman. After the Court 
affirmed the sentencing on appeal, Castillo filed three postconviction petitions for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  
In 2017, the third petition was denied by the district court as untimely with no demonstrated 
good cause or prejudice to excuse the issue. Castillo then appealed claiming that he demonstrated 
good cause and prejudice because the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst provided 
him with new and meritorious claims for relief that were not available earlier.2 
 
Discussion 
 
Hurst did not redefine the word "fact" 
 
 Castillo argued that Hurst establishes that any State which conditions death-eligibility on 
the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the result is a fact that should be subject 
to the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found instead that Hurst does not 
apply to Nevada law because the opinion only referred to the weighing component of Florida law 
as a factual finding and did so only by quoting the specific statute.  
 
The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard only applies to facts 
 
 Castillo also argued that Hurst created a requirement that anything a jury is asked to find 
which could make a defendant death-eligible must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
Court rejected this argument, finding instead that Castillo relied too heavily on scattered references 
to Florida statutes within the Hurst opinion. 
 
The weighing determination is not part of death-eligibility 
 
Under Nevada law, a defendant is death-eligible if the State satisfies each element of first-
degree murder and proves the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstance.3 The statutes 
 
1  By E. Sebastian Cate-Cribari. 
2  Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
3   See Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, 412 P.3d 54 (2018); Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356, 365-66, 351 P.3d 
725, 732 (2015). 
relevant to death-eligibility do provide that jurors cannot impose a death sentence if it concludes 
the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances.4 However, that statutory 
system only prevents jurors from sentencing death in cases where the defendant is already death-
eligible. Thus, the rule that Castillo argued the Court should adopt is irrelevant to his case. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court found that the Hurst decision cannot be interpreted to redefine the word “fact” 
in court proceedings and thus expand the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to every death-
eligibility finding a jury is tasked with. Moreover, the Court found that even if it did apply that 
interpretation, it would not apply in Castillo’s case because the jury’s weighing of mitigating 
factors is not a death-eligibility finding. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision 
to deny Castillo’s postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554(3) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. 200.030(4)(a) (2013). 
